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involved with Mary Carter agreements;4 2 the Florida Supreme Court did
not, thus deferring an issue which may cause a great degree of uncer-
tainty in the future.
JOHN EDWARD HERNDON, JR.
STATE JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: AN IMPROPER TARGET
FOR FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs instituted a federal civil rights action' against a state
attorney, his investigator, a local police commissioner, a county magis-
trate and a judge. In addition to damages, they sought to enjoin the
judges from alleged discriminatory practices in imposing bail, sentences
and court costs2 on plaintiffs and other citizens of Cairo, Illinois, who
were or would be arrested while engaging in active protests against pri-
vate and public racial discrimination in the city.' The district court dis-
missed the complaint on jurisdictional and judicial immunity grounds.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.4 Upon writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court held, reversed as to defendant judges: (1)
the case or controversy requirement is not met in a federal injunctive suit
unless the named plaintiffs, not merely members of their class, suffer con-
tinuing adverse effects of the actions to be enjoined, and (2) even assum-
ing a case or controversy existed, principles of federal-state comity pre-
clude federal injunctive relief against state judicial misconduct. O'Shea
v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974).1
By a prior decision,' the Court had held that state judges were
42. Id. at 409-10, 488 P.2d at 351-52.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 and 1951 (1970). Jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343 (1970).
2. The court costs were imposed to pay for jury trials. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d
389, 393 n.1 (7th Cir. 1972).
3. During the late 1960's and into the 1970's the [Civil Rights] Movement contended
in the streets of Cairo with white forces seeking to maintain a racial status quo
that blacks rejected ...
[Bilacks marched, boycotted and fought pitched battles with white vigilantes,
and the city experienced a long night of shooting, burning and disorder unmatched
in its duration anywhere else in the country. That night still has not ended.
P. GOOD, CAIRO, ILLINOIs: RAcISm AT FLOODTIDE 2 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1973).
Mr. Good reported that as of March, 1972, no black had ever served on the county housing
authority or welfare commission, or on the Cairo public utility commission or library board,
that in Cairo's history only one black had been a fireman and another a city commissioner,
that blacks comprised 30% of the county and 40% of the city population, and that the
median county income was $6400 for white families and $2800 for black. Id. at 5-6.
4. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
5. The case against the other defendants was remanded to determine the issue of moot-
ness. Spomer v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 685 (1974).
6. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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immune from liability for damages in suits brought under United States
Code, title 42, section 1983 (1970). That decision left unresolved the
question of whether judicial immunity barred an action for a section 1983
injunction.7 In O'Shea, such relief was denied on grounds not of judicial
immunity, but of federal-state comity." The O'Shea decision is thus a
significant application of the principles of federal nonintervention ex-
pressed in Younger v. Harris9 and its companion cases.10 A review of prior
comity cases indicates that O'Shea has narrowed further the permissible
grounds for federal intervention."
Dombrowski v. Pfister12 was a section 1983 action to enjoin state
officials from threatened bad faith prosecution of the plaintiff under a
statute invalid on its face. In granting the injunction the Court distin-
guished prior cases on the ground that the injury alleged by Dom-
browski-infringement on the exercise of first amendment rights by
harassment under an invalid law-could not be redressed in the threat-
ened state proceeding.'8
Dombrowski was broadly construed as permitting federal equitable
intervention into pending or threatened state proceedings upon the alle-
gation that the exercise of first amendment rights was being "chilled" by
the existence of invalid laws.14 This broad reading of Dombrowski was
rejected in Cameron v. Johnson.5 In that case the Court held that "a
7. It was generally thought that such relief was available. See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater,
483 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom., Gerstein v. Pugh, 94 S. Ct. 567
(1974); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 738 n.3 (5th Cir. 1967) ("[Pierson did]
not mean that [state judges] may not be enjoined from pursuing a course of unlawful
conduct."); Green v. City of Tampa, 335 F. Supp. 293 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Bramlett v.
Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311 (M.D. Fla. 1969); United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720
(S.D. Ala. 1965).
8. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) held that section 1983 actions are exempted
from the bar against federal injunctions of state court proceedings imposed by the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Mitchum cautioned that federal-state comity might
nevertheless prohibit such relief. 407 U.S. at 243-44. This case is noted at 27 U. MIAIA L.
REV. 208 (1972).
9. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
10. Boyle v. Landry, 407 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Brynes v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). Herein-
after Younger will be used to refer to all these cases unless the context otherwise indicates.
11. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDF:aRL COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970 and Supp. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court
Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TE.xAs L. REv. 535 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Maraist]; Note, 25 U. Mza.wT L. Rav. 506 (1971).
12. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The defendants were a state governor, legislator and police
officers.
13. [T]he allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the
state's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional
rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of ex-
pression will occur if appellants must await the state court's disposition and adverse
determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.
Id. at 485-86.
14. See, WRIGHT, supra note 11; Maraist, supra note 11, at 510; Note, 25 U. MIAMI
L. R v. 506, 510 (1971).
15. 390 U.S. 611 (1968). The defendants were a state governor and state law enforce-
ment officials.
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showing of 'special circumstances' beyond the injury incidental to every
proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith is requisite to a finding
of irreparable injury sufficient to justify the extraordinary remedy of an
injunction."'1 6 The Court thus hinged federal intervention primarily on
a showing of bad faith enforcement by state officials of a statute invalid
on its face or as applied. 17 In accord with Dombrowski,' it further im-
plied that a more general requirement must be met of which proven bad
faith was only one expression: the federal plaintiff could not adequately
vindicate his federal rights in the single state prosecution facing him.'"
In Younger v. Harris20 the federal plaintiff sought to enjoin his
pending state prosecution under an alleged facially invalid law. The
Court did not accept Harris' contention that he faced irreparable injury
of a sufficiently great and immediate nature as to necessitate equitable
relief. As in Cameron, the Younger Court emphasized the fatal absence
of a charge of bad faith2' and, after reviewing prior decisions to determine
the requisite "irreparable injury," noted the significance given to the
possibility of a federal plaintiff's adequately protecting his federal rights
in the pending or future state prosecution:
Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and
inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal
prosecution, could not by themselves be considered "irreparable"
in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the
plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that cannot be
eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.22
16. Id. at 618.
17. "[W]e viewed Dombrowski to be a case presenting a situation of the 'impropriety
of [state officials] invoking the statute in bad faith to impose continuing harassment in
order to discourage appellants' activities. . . .'" Id. at 619, quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965). The Court affirmed that the claim of bad faith was not supported
in the record and denied relief. 390 U.S. at 620. The Court indicated Dombrowski's rationale
would apply to bad faith enforcement of valid as well as facially invalid laws. Id.
18. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
19. [T]he record does not establish the bad faith charged. This is therefore not a
case in which ". . . a federal court of equity by withdrawing the determination of
guilt from the state courts could rightly afford [appellants] any protection which
they could not secure by prompt trial and appeal pursued to this Court."
390 U.S. at 620, citing Dougla2 v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1942).
20. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The defendant was a state district attorney.
21. It is sufficient for purposes of the present case to hold, as we do, that the
possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not in itself justify an
injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has
failed to make any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circum-
stance that would call for equitable relief.
Id. at 54. The only example of "other unusual circumstances" given in which bad faith
might not be a requisite was a statute "flagrantly and patently violative of express con-
stitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph and in whatever manner
and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it." Id. at 53-54, quoting Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
22. Id. at 46 (emphasis added). In a case relied on in the Younger decision, the Court
stated:
The accused should first set up and rely upon his defenses in the state courts, even
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The Dombrowski-Cameron-Younger formula for federal injunctive
relief thus appeared to require (1) allegations of "irreparable injury"2
to the named plaintiffs24 resulting, or threatening to result, from (2) bad
faith enforcement of a state law invalid on its face" or as applied,2" or
(3) "any other unusual circumstance" such as a statute which was
"flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional," or generally, from (4) the
fact that the federal rights allegedly violated could not be vindicated in
a defense of a single state prosecution.28
The restrictive aspect of this formula found expression in subsequent
cases.2 9 State pre-judgment garnishment and replevin statutes were de-
clared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined in Lynch v. House-
hold Finance Corp.3 0 and Fuentes v. Shevin,8l respectively. Justice White,
who wrote the majority opinion in O'Shea, dissented in both cases, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun." He would have found
lack of federal jurisdiction based on Younger so as to allow the state
courts to pass first on the federal claims, despite the fact that the federal
plaintiffs were not seeking to stay or enjoin the proceedings in which
the underlying debts were to be adjudicated.83
In Preiser v. Rodriguez84 the Court held that comity principles as
expressed in Younger necessitated invoking the federal habeas corpus
requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies35 in a section 1983
challenge by state inmates against prison procedures which allegedly
resulted in illegal denial of accrued good conduct time. 6 The Court rea-
though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly
appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926), quoted in 401 U.S. at 45.
23. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
24. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
25. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620 (1968).
27. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
28. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620
(1968); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). "Harris' constitutional con-
tentions may be adequately adjudicated in the state criminal proceeding and federal inter-
vention at his instance was therefore improper." 401 U.S. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
29. See note 8 supra for a discussion of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In a
post-O'Shea decision the Court held that Younger did not prohibit declaratory relief against
state prosecution under a facially invalid law. Steffel v. Thompson, 94 S. Ct. 1209 (1974);
cf. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
30. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
31. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
32. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who joined in the O'Shea decision, did not par-
ticipate in these cases.
33. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 98 (1972); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 560-61 (1972).
34. 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973). The defendants were state prison officials.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
36. Successful federal suits would have brought about the shortening or termination of
their sentences. 93 S. Ct. at 1832.
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soned that these principles underlie the "prior exhaustion" requirement:
[Federal-state comity] was defined in Younger v. Harris ...
as "a proper respect for state functions," and it has as much
relevance in areas of particular state administrative concern as
it does where state judicial action is being attacked. 7
The dissent argued against shielding state administrative misconduct
from direct federal review by use of comity principles which it believed
were designed to protect only state judicial proceedings."
Significantly, the Preiser majority9 cited Younger to meet the central
argument that the "prior exhaustion" requirement was triggered only in
challenges to state court action.40 Younger's restrictive side was thus
given full weight and perhaps was extended beyond the case's intended
holding.4 Not discussed were the factors of bad faith and unavailability
of vindication of federal rights in a single state proceeding which Younger
had apparently left untouched as circumstances permitting federal equi-
table intervention. 2 The record before the Court contained evidence of
these factors sufficient to warrant at least a discussion of why the Dom-
browski-Cameron-Younger rationale did not in fact implicate federal
injunctive relief.48
The plaintiffs in O'Shea sought to enjoin state judges44 from alleged
practices of racial discrimination. The result adverse to their claim was, as
Justice Douglas expressed it,45 a tour de force against such an action.
37. Id. at 1837.
38. "This is not a case .. .where federal intervention would interrupt a state pro-
ceeding or jeopardize the orderly administration of state judicial business." Id. at 1852
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall.
40. See notes 37 and 38 supra and accompanying text.
41 "(Younger] does not in any sense demand, or even counsel, today's decision." 93
S. Ct. at 1852 (dissent).
42. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
43. The findings of the district courts for each of the Preiser plaintiffs strongly imply
that they were subjected to had faith and harassment by state prison officials. Kartzoff v.
McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558, 559 (2d Cir. 1971); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247,
1250-51 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 630-32 (N.D.N.Y.
1969). Allegations of bad faith harassment were contained in each plaintiff's complaint.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1842 n.2 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the cases
of Kritsky and Rodriguez, the district court found that the prison hearing reports which
were adverse to the plaintiffs were not properly processed to enable higher administrative
review. Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247, 1250-51 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Rodriguez v.
McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 630-31 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. Other state defendants were also joined. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
Neither the decision of the court of appeals nor that of the Supreme Court clarifies whether
any of the named plaintiffs or members of their class were defendants in state criminal
proceedings pending at the time the federal suit was filed. The quote in the text accompany-
ing note 50 infra expresses this ambiguity. The Court's broad language, however, clearly
indicates that whether or not any state suits were pending, the relief sought may not be
granted. See the text accompanying notes 55-58 infra. Younger, of course, involved a pending
state prosecution. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
45. 94 S. Ct. at 681 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The complaint required dismissal, the Court reasoned in part I of
its decision, because it did not state a present case or controversy "regard-
ing injunctive relief."4 The Court found two infirmities. First, specific
charges of illegal conduct by the judges against the named plaintiffs were
lacking."7 Second, the kinds of wrongs cited-practices of discriminatory
imposition of bail, sentences and court costs-did not result in the "con-
tinuing, present adverse effects"'48 which may be redressed by an injunc-
tion because Preiser's prior exhaustion requirement4" would bar any im-
mediate federal review of state custody under an allegedly illegal sentence.
In addition, "if any plaintiffs were then on trial or awaiting trial in state
proceedings, the complaint would be seeking injunctive relief that a
federal court should not provide.""0 Finally, the conjectural nature of the
charge that plaintiffs would be subjected to future deprivations by the
judges robbed the complaint of concreteness.51 Since no statutes or their
enforcement were attacked, the Court would not presume that in the
future the plaintiffs would be arrested and exposed to the judges' alleged
misconduct.52
In part II the Court considered the complaint as satisfying the case
or controversy requirement so as to reach its merits.s First, it held that
principles of federal-state comity precluded the relief sought. The court
of appeals had determined that these principles applied narrowly to
interference with "prosecutions to be commenced under challenged stat-
utes . . . ."'I It had also suggested that the injunction could take the
form of a "periodic reporting system" and as such would not interfere
with state prosecutions.55 The Supreme Court, however, was not moved
to distinguish Younger by the fact that the O'Shea plaintiffs did not seek
to overturn any state law or stay any pending state proceeding.
An injunction of the type contemplated by [the plaintiffs] and
the Court of Appeals would disrupt the normal course of pro-
46. Id. at 676.
47. Id. at 675.
48. "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or contro-
versy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present
adverse effects." Id. at 676.
49. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
50. 94 S. Ct. at 676, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Presumably this
comment was directed at the charges of improper imposition of bail and court costs as
well as sentencing.
51. 94 S. Ct. at 676-77, 679.
52. Id. at 676-77. Justice Douglas, dissenting, cited allegations in the amended complaint
that the defendant police commissioner had unjustifiedly brought charges against the plaintiffs
to harass them and prevent their protest activities. Id. at 682. He concluded,
[these allegations support the likelihood that the named plaintiffs as well as mem-
bers of their class will be arrested in the future and therefore will be brought before
O'Shea and Spomer [the judges] and be subjected to the alleged discriminatory
practices in the administration of Justice.
Id.
53. Id. at 677.
54. Id. at 678.
55. Id. at 679.
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ceedings in the state courts via resort to the federal suit for
determination of the claim ab initio, just as would the request
for injunctive relief from an ongoing state prosecution against
the federal plaintiff which was found to be unwarranted in
Younger. . . . [I]t would require for its enforcement the con-
tinuous supervision by the federal court over the conduct of
the [defendants] in the course of future criminal trial proceed-
ings involving any of the members of [the plaintiffs'] broadly-
defined class. "
The Court stressed that "[w]hat Ithe plaintiffs] seek is an injunc-
tion aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events
that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials,"57 and
found such relief to constitute "nothing less than an ongoing audit of
state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind
of interference that Younger v. Harris and related cases sought to
prevent." '58
Second, the Court found lacking the requisites of equitable relief,
i.e., the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and
the inadequacy of legal remedies.5" It referred to its prior determination
that the alleged threatened injuries were conjectural in nature"0 and
noted that the plaintiffs could have sought redress in a number of ways
such as by substitution of judges, change of venue, direct appeal, post
conviction collateral review, federal habeas corpus, state disciplinary
proceedings, and federal criminal prosecution of the judges.61
As in Preiser, the O'Shea decision seems to have ignored the factors
in the Dombrowski-Cameron-Younger rationale12 which would implicate
federal injunctive intervention. The bad faith of state officials, playing
so significant a role in Younger and earlier decisions, was not discussed
by the O'Shea majority. The complaint, considered as stating a case or
controversy, described harassment and bad faith by state judges, officials
and police of a quite serious nature and degree." By dismissing it pri-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 679.
60. Id. See Justice Douglas' criticism of this finding discussed in note 52 supra.
61. Id. at 679-80. The dissent argued that the adverse effects of the alleged discrimina-
tion might not be remedied at trial or on appeal, and that state law made it difficult, if not
impossible, to challenge the discretion of the trial judge in sentencing. Id. at 683. Justice
Douglas further noted that the plaintiffs primarily charged discriminatory practices and
not individual instances of harsh treatment. "A class suit where evidence could be developed
showing a pattern of discriminatory bail and sentencing decisions by the [judges] would be
the one appropriate vehicle in which these claims could be developed." Id. at 683-84.
62. See notes 23-28, 42 and 43 supra and accompanying text.
63. What we have alleged here is not only wrongs done to named plaintiffs but
a recurring pattern of wrongs which establishes, if proved, that the legal regime
under control of the whites in Cairo, Illinois, is used over and over again to keep
the Blacks from exercising First Amendment rights, to discriminate against them,
to keep from the Blacks the protection of the law in their lawful activities, to
weight the scales of justice repeatedly on the side of white prejudices and against
1000
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marily on the basis of Younger, the Court went beyond the restrictions
imposed by that case on federal intervention. The result is that, whereas
bad faith enforcement of an unconstitutional statute by state police and
other officials is an appropriate target for federal injunctive relief, bad
faith misconduct by a state judge perpetrated against an accused before
him is not. The distinction was not expressly dealt with in O'Shea, and
it does not appear sufficient to justify the broad shield the Court has
erected against federal injunctive relief from state judicial misconduct,64
particularly since such an action may be the most effective means to de-
velop proof of such charges."
The more general factor-that the federal plaintiff be unable to
vindicate federal rights in the pending or threatened state prosecution-
appears to have fared no better. Certainly the Dombrowski plaintiffs
could have utilized some of the alternative remedies proposed by the
O'Shea majority, such as disciplinary proceedings and federal criminal
prosecution, yet they were not required to do so. Indeed, the O'Shea
majority's admonition that federal plaintiffs seek vindication of their
federal rights outside the state prosecution facing them had not been put
forth by any prior decision.6 The argument by the dissent and the court
of appeals that proof of the charges against the judges would have been
improbable under state law,"7 which was not met by the majority, further
undercuts the suggestion that a single state defense could vindicate the
plaintiffs' federal rights and that adequate alternative remedies existed
at law.
The O'Shea decision apparently would permit a federal court to
enjoin state judges under the following conditions: First, the federal
plaintiffs must allege specific instances of illegal actions against them by
the judges; second, the injuries arising therefrom must be continuing
and irreparable; and third, their remedies at law must be inadequate.
Prior to O'Shea, lower federal courts enjoined state judges from
violating state defendants' rights to counsel 68 and to a preliminary hear-
Black protests, fears, and suffering. This is a more pervasive scheme for suppression
of Blacks and their civil rights than I have ever seen.
93 S. Ct. at 683 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. [Where state law enforcement is in bad faith,] the reasons of policy for defer-
ring to state adjudication are outweighed by the injury flowing from the very
bringing of the state proceedings, by the perversion of the very process that is
supposed to provide vindication, and by the need for speedy and effective action
to protect federal rights.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 56 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. See note 61 supra.
66. See, e.g., the following recent statement by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
"Younger has never been applied by our circuit to force a federal court to relinquish juris-
diction over a federal claim which could not be adjudicated in a single pending or future
state proceeding . Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
in original).
67. See note 61 supra.
68. See, e.g., Green v. City of Tampa, 335 F. Supp. 293 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Bramlett v.
Peterson, 307 F. Supp. 1311 (M.D. Fla. 1969). Right to counsel violations apparently
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
ing. 0 Objections raised in O'Shea against injunctive relief would seem
applicable to these cases.70 An avenue into federal court, however, might
be found by maintaining that the injuries arising from denial of counsel
or pre-trial liberty are more clearly "irreparable" than those alleged in
O'Shea.7' An additional distinguishing fact in these cases was that the
applicable law was unclear.72 Nevertheless, the possibility of federally
enjoining state judicial misconduct, which may border on criminal cul-
pability, appears foreclosed.
WILLIAM BERGER
A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE UCC EXTENDS
FLORIDA'S POLICY OF DEBTOR PROTECTION
Irving Turk, president of Bob King, Inc., acted as co-maker in exe-
cuting a $35,000 note along with a security agreement to plaintiff-bank as
consideration for floor-plan financing of automobiles which the company
was selling. Before Turk ceased to be active in the corporation, he joined
Bob King, Inc., in substituting a note of $20,000 for the original one. The
bank continued to advance monies until an indebtedness of $36,336 was
reached. At that point the bank notified Bob King, Inc., took possession
of and then sold the pledged automobiles without notifying Turk. Since
only $17,881.52 of the alleged outstanding indebtedness was realized, the
bank sued Turk for the deficiency plus interest. A jury returned a verdict
of $7,490 in favor of the bank. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held, reversed: If the secured creditor repossesses and
sells the pledged goods, without notifying the debtor pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 679.504(3) (1971),1 the creditor forfeits his right to a
continue in Florida municipal courts. See, Wisotsky, The Status of Municipal Courts in
Florida, 48 FLA. B.J. 290 (1974).
69. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. Injunctions against the violations alleged in these cases would also seem to require
the daily "monitoring" of and potential interference with state court proceedings by con-
tempt hearings in federal court which were rejected in O'Shea. In addition, remedies other
than injunctive relief, such as federal habeas corpus, would appear available to the federal
plaintiff.
71. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Pugh v. Rainwater, .483 F.2d 778,
783 (5th Cir. 1973) expressly declined to rule whether loss of liberty through denial of the
right to a preliminary hearing fell within the "irreparable injury" exception to Younger.
72. The right to counsel cases cited in note 68 supra were prior to, and raised issues
which were finally disposed of, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401 U.S. 908 (1972). Pugh, a case
of first impression, is now before the Court. 94 S. Ct. 567 (1974). The impermissible conduct
in these cases was "valid" under prior law and was, thus, more likely to recur if injunctive
relief was denied or to cease once a definitive statement of federal rights was rendered,
than the criminal conduct alleged in O'Shea.
1. The statute provides in part:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time
1002
